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Reform of the Coal Sector in an Open Economy: 
The Case of China 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
           As the second source of primary energy after oil and the first source of fuel for 
electricity generation in the world, coal remains a crucial part of the energy mix, in 
particular in emerging economies. The surge in global coal consumption over the last 
decade has been driven primarily by developing economies, mainly China and India 
(IEA, 2012). Cheap and abundant, coal has fuelled China’s economy. Coal and coal-
fired electricity are used as intermediate consumption, mostly by firms, many of 
which now compete internationally in final product markets. Given the role of 
manufactured exports as the main driver of China’s economic growth, policies and 
reforms adopted in the coal sector will impact not only on how coal will be produced 
and used domestically but also on the competitiveness of downstream, exporting 
manufacturing firms, and in turn national competitiveness. It is therefore important 
for policy makers to take a broader view when designing and implementing coal 
policies, going beyond the boundary of the sector and taking into consideration 
possible impact on other parts of the economy.  
 
           China’s coal industry has undergone various reforms since the late 1970s as 
central planning was gradually dismantled and market mechanism introduced. Coal 
prices were liberalised from the mid 1990s for all but the power generation and 
agriculture sectors, and from 2002 officially all prices were supposed to be market-
determined (Peng, 2011). However, given coal’s dominance in electricity generation 
and strictly regulated electricity tariffs, prices for thermal coal are still subjective to 
government intervention (Lin and Jiang, 2011).
1
 In the sector, corporatisation started 
from the late 1990s, accompanied by partial or full transfer of state ownership to 
private investors in some coalmines. The experience of other transition economies 
shows that, due to slacks in regulation and corporate governance, a restructuring 
process involving both corporatisation and privatisation may lead to opportunistic 
behaviour such as asset stripping, undervalued and under-priced state assets, insider 
control and managerial entrenchment, and de-capitalisation – all attempted for private 
gains at the expense of social welfare (Frydman, et al, 1990; Lipton and Sachs, 1990; 
Winiecki, 1990; Milanovic, 1991; Newbery, 1991; Bolton, et al, 1992; Alexeev, 1999; 
Frydman, et al, 1999; Black, et al, 2000; Richter, 2002; Filatotchev, et al, 2003). It is 
therefore important to understand whether coal firms undergoing privatisation will 
engage in such behaviour, in reaction to coal reforms and policies adopted. 
 
           One of the most recent debates on China’s coal industry is the reform of coal 
taxation. Chinese coalmines are subject to two types of taxes – general taxes mainly 
in the form of value added tax, business tax and income tax; and special taxes such as 
coal resource tax and environment-related taxes. In addition, coal firms are required to 
transfer part of their profits (if any) to the government, a practice which can be traced 
back to the early years of economic reform in China when state-owned firms started 
                                                 
1
 In China, there are two sets of electricity prices – on-grid tariffs and end-use rates – both regulated by 
the government. More detailed discussion on electricity prices and the political economy of setting 
them can be found in Zhang (2013).  
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sharing their profit with the government under a profit-retention scheme.
2
  Having 
since then undergone various amendments, such charges used for coal firms now take 
the form of lump-sum fees, primarily for the purpose of equalising the profits of the 
coal and other industries (Li and Zhang, 2012). With regards to coal tax reform, there 
have been calls for revamping the special taxes and streamlining unreasonable fees or 
levies, in order to encourage sustainable usage of this non-renewable resource. It can 
be expected that such reforms will not only impact on the behaviour of coal firms but 
also have important implications for downstream, coal- and electricity-intensive, 
export-oriented manufacturing firms.  
 
          One debated issue is whether the above-mentioned lump-sum fees should be 
scrapped and coal firms be only subject to coal specific taxes (apart from general 
taxes).
3
 It has been argued that these fees – a legacy of central planning– have become 
ill-suited in the emerging market economy of China and that more reliance should be 
placed on the use of well-designed coal-specific taxes to induce firms to achieve 
sustainable development of the industry (Zeng and Li, 2013). To policy makers, this is 
not an easy task and many issues need to be considered. Is the use of the lump-sum 
fees now unjustified? Will the reform increase social welfare in China where both 
energy and manufactured exports are important for economic growth? Will 
corporatised coal firms become more prone to engage in opportunistic behaviour in 
the process of privatisation? Will there be potential resistance from interest groups? 
Addressing these questions requires an analysis which takes into consideration the 
interests of the three entities – the government, coal firms, and downstream, export-
oriented manufacturing firms.
4
 The present study develops a game-theoretical model 
tailored to the context of China where coal tax reform takes place against the 
background of privatisation of coal firms and an open economy. The model depicts 
and compares between what would happen when the lump-sum fees are levied and the 
scenario in which coal firms are only subject to coal-specific taxes, alongside a 
baseline case of ‘no taxation at all’.5  
 
           The contribution of this paper is two-folded. First, it joins the discourse on 
China’s coal industry and presents a timely analysis which takes a broader view of 
coal tax reform. Second, in doing so, it contributes to the literature by linking 
privatisation and taxation in the coal industry with downstream manufacturing sectors 
in open economies.  
 
Following the seminal work of Hotelling (1931), important contribution to economics 
of non-renewable resources has been made by studies such as Dasgupta and Heal 
(1974), Stiglitz (1976), Pindyck (1980), Livernois and Uhler (1987) and 
Krautkraemer (1998). There are studies which model the effects of taxes and 
subsidies in extractive industries and their optimal levels (e.g., Barness, 1976; 
Sweeney, 1977; Dasgupta, et al, 1980; Conrad and Hool, 1981; Heaps, 1985; Slade, 
                                                 
2
 Economic reform started in China in 1979. In the mid 1980s, a profit retention scheme was introduced 
for industrial firms, in which they would submit a given percentage of their profits to government 
authorities and retain the rest.  
3
 Another debated issue is whether the coal resource tax should be calculated based on sales value or 
production volume. A reform plan for the adoption of sales-value-based taxes has been made and is 
expected to take effect soon. 
4
 Electricity generating firms are not explicitly considered in the analysis for reasons stated in Section 2. 
5
 General taxes, which are not a major concern of coal tax reform, are not incorporated in the model.  
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1986). In the privatisation literature, models theorising the political economy and the 
consequences of privatising state-owned firms are presented in studies like Boycko, et 
al (1994) and Shleifer and Vishny (1994). Mixed oligopoly models have often been 
used to analyse the effects of privatisation (e.g., Cremer, et al, 1989, 1991; DeFraja 
and Delbono, 1989; Fershtman, 1990; George and La Manna, 1996; Fjell and Pal, 
1996; White, 1996; Matsumura, 1998). Among studies of open economies, most 
attention has been on the role of trade or/and industrial policy in promoting domestic 
firms in international competition (e.g., Spencer and Brander, 1983; Brander and 
Spencer, 1985; Eaton and Grossman, 1986; Maggi, 1996; Bagwell and Staiger, 1999; 
Neary and Leahy, 2000).  
 
           Although literature is growing in each of the above areas – economics and 
taxation of non-replenishable natural resources, privatisation, and trade/industrial 
policy in an open economy, not many attempts have been made to incorporate more 
than one of these aspects. Pal and White (1998), Fjell and Heywood (2002), Chang 
(2005), and Chao and Yu (2006) are among the few studies which investigate the 
effects of privatisation when domestic firms face international competition. Dasgupta, 
et al (1978), Aarrestad, (1978), Brander and Djajic (1983) and Hillman and Long 
(1983) analyse depletion policies against the background of open economies, but the 
focus is on their effects on the exports of the exhaustible resources in concern. There 
is a gap in the literature to integrate the above three areas. This paper attempts to fill 
in the gap by presenting a model in which the analysis of coal policies incorporates 
coal firm privatisation and related opportunistic behaviour, and extends to export-
oriented manufacturing sectors of an open economy – China.  
 
            The paper is organised as follows. The next section outlines the game 
theoretical model and related assumptions, followed by the solution to the game in 
Section 3. Section 4 compares the scenarios of different tax regimes with regard to 
social welfare, the extent of privatisation of coal firms and related opportunistic 
behaviour, consumer surplus, profits of coal firms, and government tax revenues. 
Section 5 presents a numerical case study to which the model is applied. The last 
section concludes. 
 
 
2. The Methodology and Model 
 
           This section describes the configuration of the model.  
 
2.1 Three-stage Theoretical Game 
 
           Coal-fired power is the largest user of coal in China, accounting for around 
50% of the total coal consumption and producing about 80% of the total electricity 
supply (IEA, 2000; 2012). Industries have been the largest electricity consumer, and 
the share of manufacturing sectors in total industrial electricity consumption has been 
growing. For simplicity, we only consider coal consumption by power generation, 
assuming that all the coal supplied is used for producing electricity, and that all 
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electricity generated is consumed by downstream manufacturing sectors.
6
 We also 
exclude from the analysis imports and exports of coal and electricity, which have so 
far accounted for a relatively small part of their respective total supplies.
7
  
 
           There are three players in the game: (i) the government, (ii) coal firms,
8
 and (iii) 
electricity-intensive, manufacturing firms which compete with foreign firms in the 
market of final products. In the model, electricity generating firms that consume coal 
and supply electricity to manufacturing sectors are not considered as a separate player, 
based on the observation in China. Despite continuous conflicts between coal firms 
and coal-fired power companies, which have been intensified after the coal price 
liberalisation, the government has often used administrative intervention in both 
industries to ensure the coal supply for electricity generation, coupled by schemes 
such as the coal-electricity price co-movement policy that allows adjustments in on-
grid and end-user electricity tariffs in the event of a rise of 5% or more in coal prices 
(Ma and Oxley, 2010). In general, facing strictly regulated electricity prices and pre-
defined output quotas, power companies are not allowed to supply large industrial 
users directly and, generally, cannot decide on how much electricity to produce, at 
what price, and for whom.
9
 Thus, excluding coal-fired electricity producers from the 
game will simplify the model without compromising the analysis.
10
  
 
           In order to cast light on the debate of whether to scrap the lump-sum fees and 
subject coal firms only to special taxes, we develop a three-stage game (see Figure 1). 
In the first stage, the government chooses among three tax regimes – the lump-sum 
fees, coal-specific taxes, or no taxation at all, with the objective of maximising social 
welfare.
11
 We assume that coal-specific taxes are levied to correct for the losses in 
social welfare when welfare-maximising state-owned firms are privatised. In the coal 
industry, privatisation is likely to lead to social welfare reduction in the form of 
negative externalities - environmental, inter-generational, etc.. Such welfare losses 
can be partially compensated by levying resource and environment-related taxes. We 
also assume that the lump-sum fees are levied in such a way as to equalise the profits 
of the coal industry and downstream manufacturing sectors. For simplicity, we use 
                                                 
6
 Considerable volume of coal may also be consumed directly by manufacturing firms. The analysis 
presented in the paper will not change even if such coal consumption is considered, given the three 
main players involved in the model. 
7
 China has witnessed a rise in its coal imports since 2009, with Indonesia and Australian being its 
largest overseas coal suppliers. However, the amount of coal imported in comparison to the county’s 
total coal consumption is still small (e.g. 126 v.s. 2985 Mt in 2009).  
8
 In the model, we consider national or ‘key’ state-owned coal firms – the term used in Tu (2011) – 
which accounted for half of the national coal output in 2009. 
9
 See Zhang (2013) for more details on electricity prices and the quota-based dispatch system in China. 
10
 Electricity companies, in particular those that are centrally state-owned, have a strong bargaining 
power with government agencies (Zhang, 2013). Nonetheless, their influence falls, arguably, outside 
the loop of the game, in particular when the model is mainly concerned with the government’s choice 
of coal taxation regime.  
11
 The literature debates whether governments are social-welfare or private-interest maximisers. We 
assume that the government is benevolent, as many existing studies do (e.g., Mujumdar and Pal, 1998; 
Pal and White, 1998; Leahy and Neary, 2001). In addition, we distinguish between government and 
government officials, emphasising the former’s role as the policy maker while recognising the latter’s 
self-interested and rent-seeking nature. 
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‘fees’ to refer to the lump-sum fees and ‘taxes’ to coal-specific taxes in the rest of the 
text.
12
 
 
           In stage two, having observed the chosen coal taxation regime, coal firms will 
make their decision. Unlike most existing studies, we don’t assume that coal firms can 
choose their output levels in order to maximise their objective function, because the 
government often intervenes in big energy firms’ decisions over investment and 
production to ensure adequate energy supply for economic growth, a practice likely to 
continue in the coal industry in the foreseeable future.
13
 Instead, we assume that coal 
firms influence the extent of privatisation and whether to engage in opportunistic 
behaviour. Although some existing studies see the degree of privatisation as 
exogenous while others are ambiguous about whose decision it is to privatise,
14
 we 
assume explicitly in the model that privatisation is coal firm’s decision, for reasons 
discussed below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Flowchart of the Three-stage Theoretical Game 
 
 
           Firstly, a general observation in China is that large energy companies are 
influential in their relations with government agencies (Xu, 2008). Senior managers of 
major state-owned coal firms have administrative ranks no lower than that of the 
governing agencies, and have close political ties with top leadership of the 
government. Therefore, treating privatisation as a decision by coal-firms is justified as 
their managers will be part of the decision-making body over issues such as 
                                                 
12
 These terms are used for simplicity and do not match those used in taxation literature.  
13
 See Zhang (2013) and Peng (2011) for examples of government intervention in coal and electricity 
industries.  
14
 For instance, the degree of privatisation is taken as exogenous in Chao and Yu (2006) and 
Matsumura (1998). Section V in Shleifer and Vishny (1994) provides an interesting discussion that the 
decision to privatise is the outcome of bargaining between politicians, the Treasury and taxpayers. 
Laffont (2005) develops a model in which the incentives for privatisation are a function of various 
exogenous variables and ownership affects the ability of governments to extract rents. 
Government 
Coal firms 
Domestic manufacturing 
firms 
Foreign manufacturing 
firms 
Choice of tax regime 
Deciding the extent of 
privatisation and related 
opportunistic behaviour 
Decisiding quantities 
supplied to domestic and 
foreign markets 
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privatisation, or at least will have influence on the direction of policy. This view holds 
some applicability to other transition and developing economies where energy firms 
are controlled by the ruling elite which can influence or even have the outright control 
over government agencies (Banerjee and Munger, 2004). Secondly, this approach 
allows us to shed light on an interesting question. That is, if the managers of coal 
firms could influence the issue of privatisation, which is likely given their influence 
over and presence in key government bureaucracy, would they attempt to privatise 
their companies in response to coal tax reform and what implications would this have 
for downstream manufacturing sectors? Thirdly, original to the literature, the paper 
incorporates opportunistic behaviour in the analysis of privatisation. Arguably, it will 
be at the discretion of large coal firms whether to engage in social-welfare detrimental 
practices. 
 
           Following Matsumura (1998) and Chao and Yu (2006), we employ a mixed 
oligopoly model to formulate the objective function of coal firms, in which they are 
assumed to maximise the weighted average of social welfare and their own profits, 
with the weights associated with the extent of privatisation. 
 
           In the third stage of the game, after knowing the choice of the government and 
the decision of coal firms, domestic manufacturing firms choose their output levels to 
maximise profits, in competition with foreign firms that decide over their own supply 
quantities in pursuit of profit maximisation. For simplicity, we do not take into 
account tariffs and other trade barriers for the final products. This assumption is 
justifiable when regional and international trade agreements have increasingly called 
for removal of such barriers.  
 
           We solve the game by backward induction and begin with the third-stage 
subgame. 
 
2.2 Subgame of Downstream Manufacturing Firms 
 
           We assume that home and foreign firms produce a homogeneous product, 
competing in both home and foreign markets. They choose their output levels à la the 
Cournot equilibrium in both the markets to maximise their respective aggregate 
profits. We define qd  as the output of domestic firms and β as the share of total 
output which is exported. Similarly, qf is the output of foreign firms’ and γ their 
share of output used for exporting to China. Therefore, the total supply quantity (Q) is 
(1-β)×qd + γ×qf on Chinese domestic market and β×qd + (1-γ)×qf on the 
foreign market, where β、γ∈[0, 1]. Generally speaking, the price of the product, 
p, can be derived by taking the inverse demand function, i.e. p=a-Q, with a as market 
size (or total market demand). Thus, prices in the domestic and foreign markets are 
given, by pd= a-(1-β)×qd-γ×qf and pf= a-β×qd-(1-γ)×qf respectively. The 
marginal costs of domestic and foreign firms are cd and cf respectively. Because of 
lack of further information on their cost structures, we follow the literature assuming 
that the two groups of firms employ identical technologies and thus face the same 
marginal cost. That is, cd=cf=c. Like most existing studies, we assume fixed costs are 
0. Thus, the profit of domestic and foreign firms – πd and πf–are written respectively 
as 
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πd(qd,qf)=β×[a-β×qd-(1-γ)×qf-c]×qd+(1-β)×[a-(1-β)×qd-γ×qf-c]×qd,               (1) 
 
πf(qd,qf)=γ×[a-(1-β)×qd-γ×qf-c]×qf +(1-γ)×[a-β×qd-(1-γ)×qf–c]×qf  .                           (2) 
 
           By solving simultaneously the first order conditions of equations (1) and (2), 
we can obtain the equilibrium outputs of domestic and foreign firms, qd*, qf*, which 
are the function of β and γ. Based on Hessian Matrices of πd and πf (see Appendix 
2), their leading principal minors are negative and positive, indicating that they are 
both strictly concave and the solutions are local maxima. Expanded algebraic 
expressions of qd*, qf* are shown in Appendix 1. Accordingly, we could obtain the 
equilibrium profit of domestic firms, πd*, again as a function of β and γ (see 
equation A2 in Appendix 1 for the expanded expression).  
 
2.3 Subgame of Coal Firms 
 
           In the second stage of the game, coal firms make a decision about privatisation 
to maximise their objective function, which, following Matsumura (1998) and Chao 
and Yu (2006), is given by П=α×π+(1-α)×W, where π is the profit of coal firms 
and W social welfare. α– the weight associated with profit – is interpreted in the 
literature as the shares controlled by private owners, with a value between 0 and 1. In 
our model, however, we relax the constraint, allowing α to take a value bigger than 
1. This is to take into consideration opportunistic behaviour of privatised firms, 
prevalent in developing and transition economies due to institutional weaknesses and 
slacks in corporate governance (Dewatripont and Roland, 1992; Estache and Wren-
Lewis, 2009). α exceeds the value of 1 if a fully-privatised coal firm engages in such 
behaviour. In this way, we are able to model the decision of coal firms over the issue 
of privatisation and their motivation to engage in opportunistic practices, in response 
to the government’s choice of taxation regime.  
 
           Taxes are levied to compensate partly for the loss of welfare caused by 
privatisation. State-owned firms maximise social welfare and in this process negative 
externalities, which takes the form of a quadratic cost function in most existing 
literature, is fully internalised. When privatised, firms deviate from the objective of 
welfare maximising, in proportion to the share of private ownership. In such cases, 
negative externalities are only internalised in proportion to the share of state 
ownership. The remaining externalities can be partially compensated by levying taxes, 
to the amount of α*t *[output of coal], where t represents the tax rate.15  
 
           When we take the measure unit of coal output and that of the manufactured 
goods in such a way that one unit of coal produces one unit of the final product, the 
marginal cost faced by coal firms can be set equal to the marginal cost of downstream 
firms, c. Thus, the coal price - as given by the inverse demand function of coal - can 
be written as p=a-Q, identical in algebraic expression to the price function of the final 
product. In the rest of the paper, we use the subscripts T, F and N to denote the regime 
of taxes, fees and no taxation, respectively. Coal firms’ profit under taxes, πT, is 
given by  
                                                 
15
 In the model, we don’t distinguish explicitly between inter-generational and environmental 
externalities. Instead, they are modelled together as qd
*2
/2 in the analysis. The taxes used to compensate 
for the externalities include both coal resource taxes and environment-related taxes. 
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πT=[a-qd
*
-α×t-c]×qd
*
-(1-α)×qd
*2
/2                                                              (3) 
 
where qd* is the equilibrium output of domestic manufacturing firms. qd
*2
/2 in 
Equation (3) is the negative externalities, given in the form of a quadratic cost 
function.  
 
           Fees are levied with the effect of equalising profit levels across industries. 
Thus, coal firms’ profit under fees, πF, is set as 
 
πF≡πd
*
                                                                                                                 (4) 
 
where πd* is the profit of domestic manufacturing firms when producing the 
equilibrium output.  
 
As a baseline scenario, no taxation is levied. Coal firms’ profit πN is expressed as  
 
πN≡π{T|t=0}                                                                                                                 (5) 
 
Let consumer surplus in the domestic market be 
 
CS=[(1-β)×qd
*+γ×qf
*
]
2
/2-α×qd
*2
/2                                                                     (6) 
 
where qd* and qf* are equilibrium outputs of domestic and foreign manufacturing 
firms.  
 
2.4 Subgame of the Government 
 
           Maximising social welfare is the objective of the government in the first stage 
of the game. The following equations give the algebraic expressions of social welfare 
under taxes, fees and no taxation at all, respectively.  
 
WT=CST+πd
*
+πT ,                                                                                           (7) 
WF=CSF+πd
*
+πF,                                                                                               (8) 
WN=CSN+πd
*
+πN.                                                                                             (9) 
 
 
3. Solving the Game 
 
           Backward induction applied to finite games is used here to solve the model. In 
this section, the solutions under the three taxation regimes are discussed. 
 
3.1 The Regime of Taxes 
 
           By substituting qd* into Equation (6), we obtain consumer surplus under taxes, 
CST(α; β, γ), as a function of α.Similarly, we obtain from qd* and Equation (3) 
the coal firms’ profit after tax, πT(α; β, γ). The objective function of coal firms is 
given by ПT(α; β, γ)= α×πT(α; β, γ)+(1-α)×WT=α×πT(α; β, γ)+(1-
α)×[πd*+CST(α; β, γ)+ πT(α; β, γ)]. When ∂ПT(α; β, γ)/∂α=0，П
10 
 
T(α; β, γ) is maximised with respect to α, giving the sub-game equilibrium 
extent of privatisation, αT(t; β, γ). Substituting αT(t; β, γ),πd*, CST(α; β
, γ)and πT(α; β, γ) into Equation (7), and making ∂WT( t; β, γ)/∂t=0, we 
obtain the optimal tax rate, t, as a function of β and γ(see equation A3 as the 
algebraic expression) 
 
          By substituting the optimal tax rate – t(β, γ) – into αT(t; β, γ), we 
obtain the equilibrium extent of privatisation, αT(β, γ), whose algebraic form is 
given by equation A?. In turn, the equilibrium profit of coal firms (πT) and consumer 
surplus (CST), both as functions of β and γ, can be derived. Up to now, we have 
obtained all the elements in Equation (7) to compute the equilibrium social welfare 
under the regime of taxes (see Equation A7 for the expanded algebraic expression).  
 
3.2 The Regime of Fees 
 
           When fees are collected, coal firms’ profit expressed as a function of α is, by 
assumption, set equal to that of manufacturing firms. That is, πF(α; β, γ)≡πd*. 
The objective function of coal firms can be expressed in terms α, as ПF(α; β,γ). 
We then maximise ПF(α; β, γ) with respect to α to obtain the sub-game 
equilibrium extent of privatisation,αT, whose algebraic expression is given in A4.                                                                                           
 
           Under this taxation regime, government revenues are the fees levied on coal firms 
– GF= πT|{t=0,α=αF(β,γ)} - πF(α; β, γ), where the first term is given by Equation 
(3) and the second term equals πd*. Social welfare under fees is WF=πd*+CSF(α; β, γ)+ 
πF(α; β, γ). Note that so far GF and WF have been expressed as a function of α. By 
simply substituting αT into the two equations, we can obtain GF and WF in the form of a 
function of β and γ. (see equations A13 and A8 for the algebraic expressions). 
 
 
3.3 The Case of no Taxation 
 
           When the government chooses not to levy taxes or fees, coal firms’ profit πN is 
given by Equation (5) or Equation (3) with t=0, as a function of α. We write the 
objective function of coal firms ПN in terms of α, and obtain the sub-game 
equilibrium extent of privatisation, αN(β, γ), by maximising ПN through making 
∂ПN(α; β, γ)/∂α=0. Substituting αN(β, γ) into Equation (9) gives the 
equilibrium social welfare when no taxation is levied, expressed as a function of β 
and γ (see A9 as the algebraic form) 
 
 
4. Comparison of the Taxation Regimes 
 
           Based on the solutions to the model, this section compares the three regimes 
along the dimensions of social welfare, the extent of privatisation of coal firms and 
the likelihood for them to commit opportunistic behaviour, consumer surplus, coal 
firms’ profit, and government tax revenues. Given the complex mathematic 
transformation used to derive these variables as a function of β and γ and their 
cumbersome algebra expressions as shown in the appendix, we use graphs produced 
by the software Mathematica 5.0 to make visual comparison of the taxation regimes 
11 
 
The purpose is to see which regime is optimal in terms of social welfare, and, if 
adopted, whether coal firms will engage in opportunistic behaviour and whether the 
reform will face resistance from coal firms, consumers and/or government officials.  
 
4.1 Comparison with regard to Social Welfare  
 
           Figures 2-a, 2-b and 2-c illustrate, in a pair-wise way, the difference in the 
equilibrium social welfare between the taxation regimes. Axes x and y represent γ 
and β respectively. The vertical axis is △W, the difference in social welfare between 
the regimes in comparison, with (a-c)
2
 as the measure unit. In the bracket of each 
figure’s title are the two taxation regimes to be compared, with the first one 
represented by the plain plot surface and the second by the checked plot surface.  
Figure 2-a shows that, in most cases, social welfare under taxes is higher than that 
under fees. The probability of this occurrence is 94.82%, which is calculated by 
subtracting from 1 the area of the plain surface when it is below the checked surface.
16
  
Figure 2-b compares levying taxes with no taxation, showing that social welfare under 
taxes is always higher than the case of no taxation at all. When the regime of fees is 
compared with levying nothing (see Figure 2-c), the probability of the former 
producing higher social welfare than the latter is as small as 0.1532, occurring only 
when a moderate β is combined with either a very high or very low γ.  
 
           In order to get a better idea about which regime and under what circumstance 
will produce superior results in terms of social welfare, Figure 2-d is constructed, 
which divides the two-dimensional space into four areas according to the values of β 
and γ. Area I represents the situation in which domestic manufacturing firms’ export 
share is moderate (0.3583<β<0.7507) while foreign firms’ export share γ is high, 
above 0.81, corresponding to the upper part of the plain surface above the checked 
one in Figure 2-c. This is an area in which the equilibrium social welfare under taxes 
is higher than that under fees, which is in turn higher than no taxation at all. Thus, 
when there is on the domestic market a large quantity of products exported by foreign 
firms but domestic firms are only able to export a moderate portion of their output to 
the foreign market, the optimal taxation regime is levying taxes. Area II denotes the 
cases in which foreign firms’ export share is in the middle range, corresponding to the 
area where the plain surface goes beneath the checked one in Figure 2-c. With the 
equilibrium social welfare under taxes being the highest and that under fees the 
lowest, the optimal regime in Area II is levying taxes. When domestic firms export a 
moderate share of their output (0.334<β<0.7057) while foreign firms export a very 
low share (γ<0.1998), as depicted by Area IV in Figure 2-d and the area of the plain 
surface which goes below the checked surface in Figure 2-a, the optimal regime is 
levying fees. Taking Areas I, II, and IV out of the two-dimensional space of Figure 2-
d gives Area III, where domestic firms’ export share is moderate (0.2328<β<0.7488) 
and foreign firms export a relatively smaller share (0.1998<γ<0.2926) of their 
output. The optimal taxation regime in this area is tax.  
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 The Monte Carlo simulation method is used to calculate the probability here and those in the later 
part of the section, in which an interval of length 0.001 within [0, 1] is used for the inputs β and γ, 
resulting in 1 million trial runs. 
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Figure 2-a. Social Welfare (taxes v.s. fees)           Figure 2-b. Social Welfare (taxes v.s. no taxation)    
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Figure 2-c. Social Welfare (fees v.s. no taxation)            Figure 2-d. Comparison of Social Welfare 
 
 
          The comparison indicates that levying neither taxes nor fees is always an 
inferior policy option and that the optimal regime in most cases is tax. This result is 
generally in line with the theoretical prediction that, for nonrenewable resources like 
coal, which is an important energy source and whose extraction and consumption is 
associated with substantial externalities, the use of special taxes as an economic 
instrument tend to have the effect of altering the behaviour of coal firms over coal 
extraction and production (e.g. Garnaut and Ross, 1975; Robinson, 1983; Fraser and 
Kingwell, 1997; Bosquet, 2002; Lund, 2002; Schoeb, 2003; Bretschger and Valente, 
2010). Going a step further, our result suggests that the use of such taxes is, under 
most circumstances, associated with higher social welfare in the context of an open 
economy when downstream manufacturing sectors is incorporated into the analysis. 
The superiority of taxes to fees in most of the cases implies that taxes will do a better 
job at correcting for the deviation of coal firms from social welfare maximisation 
when they are privatised. This is because the social welfare loss associated with 
market failure, in particular the failure of internalising externalities under private 
ownership, can be partly compensated for by levying taxes from privatized firms. 
Based on the above discussion, we can obtain the following result. 
 
Result 1: Under most circumstances, the optimal taxation regime is to levy taxes. 
Levying fees is optimal only when domestic firms export a moderate share of their 
output and foreign firms export a small share.  
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4.2 Comparison with regard to Privatisation and Opportunistic Behaviour 
 
           When privatised, firms may have incentive to engage in opportunistic 
behaviour which reduces social welfare. This is more likely in developing and 
transition economies where institutions are weak and corporate governance 
mechanisms are less effective or simply not in place to control such practices. In the 
model, we allow the parameter α to take values bigger than 1 to account for such 
behaviour. Thus, α is larger than 1 when coal firms commit opportunistic practices, 
making the weight attached to social welfare in their objective function (П=α×π
+(1-α)×W) negative. As pure profit maximisers, coal firms with full private 
ownership would no longer care about social welfare in their objective function. 
Rather, by engaging in opportunistic behaviour, they would maximise their private 
gains at the expense of social welfare.  
 
           Figures 3-a and 3-b are constructed to illustrate coal firms’ tendency to commit 
opportunistic practices under fees and taxes respectively. For the comparison purpose, 
Figure 3-c illustrates the scenario in which the government chooses to levy neither 
fees nor taxes, although it is clear from the last sub-section that this regime is not 
optimal under any circumstances.  
 
 
                    
Figure 3-a. Privatisation and                                                     Figure 3-b. Privatisation and                     
Opportunistic Behaviour (fees)                                                  Opportunistic Behaviour (taxes)  
 
 
Figure 3-c. Privatisation and 
Opportunistic Behaviour (no taxation) 
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           Figure 3-a indicates that coal firms would always engage in opportunistic 
behaviour under fees. This is in line with intuition that, once their profit is set equal to 
that of the manufacturing sectors, coal firms under privatization would resort to 
practices such as asset stripping, under-pricing state assets, de-capitalisation, etc., in 
order to enlarge their private gain. Note that levying fees is the optimal regime in the 
cases depicted in Area IV in Figure 2-d. Thus, we can obtain the following result.  
 
Result 2: when the export share of domestic firms is moderate and that of foreign 
firms is small, the adoption of levying fees as the optimal taxation regime to maximise 
social welfare will induce privatised coal firms to commit opportunistic behaviour. 
 
           If the government chooses the regime of taxes, as shown in Figure 3-b, the 
extent of privatisation decided by coal firms would be smaller compared with the 
other two regimes. There are two circumstances in which opportunistic behaviour 
would occur. One is when domestic firms export a small share of their output while 
foreign firms export around or above half of their output, corresponding to a 
probability of 0.1306. The other is when domestic firms export nearly all their output 
while the export share of foreign firms stays in the middle range, with an approximate 
probability of 0.0053. In other words, the probability of coal firms deciding not to 
engage in opportunistic practices is 0.8642. Overall, levying taxes is associated with 
the lowest probability of opportunistic behaviour among the three taxation regimes. A 
possible explanation is that, when part of their profit is taken away in the form taxes 
and thereby their objective function diverges from their profit function, coal firms 
have to make a balance between the private gains from opportunistic behavior and the 
amount of profit submitted as taxes, thus becoming less tempted to commit these 
practices.  
 
          The following result can be obtained.  
 
Result 3: under circumstances other than the ones in Result 2, levying taxes as the 
optimal regime for social welfare maximisation will not induce coal firms to commit 
opportunistic behaviour, except for the cases where β is low and γ is from 
moderate to high, or when β is nearly 1 and γ moderate. 
 
           In the cases referred to as exceptions in Results 3 (as illustrated in the two 
areas where the plain surface is above the checked plane in Figure 3-b), opportunistic 
behaviour would occur. However, a close look at the figures reveals that the extent of 
such behaviour under taxes would be smaller than that under either of the other two 
regimes. In other words, when it is adopted as the optimal regime for social welfare, 
levying taxes is also optimal for reducing the severity of opportunistic practices. 
 
          It is clear from the discussion that, when the optimal taxation regime is adopted 
for the purpose of maximising social welfare, coal firms may choose to behave 
opportunistically when privatised. The government needs to anticipate such behaviour 
and find ways to mitigate its detrimental effects. One option is to reduce the output of 
domestic firms – qd – to reduce negative externalities formulated as qd
*2
/2, so that the  
part of the externalities which is not internalised (in the magnitude of (1-α)×qd2/2)) 
can be reduced. Another option relates to the deployment of cleaner coal-fired 
15 
 
electricity generation technologies.
17
 Which is more desirable depends on the 
circumstances in question and policy makers’ priorities. If the priority lies in 
promoting economic growth and the development of manufacturing sectors, the 
second option can be pursued. If the economy is shifting from extensive to intensive 
growth and more weight is given to sustainable development, the two options can be 
combined. 
 
4.3 Comparison with regard to Consumer Surplus 
 
           In order to compare consumer surplus under different taxation regimes, Figures 
4-a, 4-b and 4-c are constructed in a similar way to Figures 2-a to 2-c. The vertical 
axis represents consumer surplus (CS), with (a-c)
2
 as the measure unit. The figures 
show consumer surplus is highest under taxes and lowest under fees. An elaborate 
explanation to the result has to do with the way in which the model is constructed, 
where the magnitude of the negative externalities borne by consumers – α×qd2/2 – 
varies under different taxation regimes according to α, which is in turn a function of 
β and γ, whose equilibrium levels are both affected by the government’s choice of 
taxation regime. Intuition can be useful to understand the result. As shown in 
Equation (8), there are two terms in the calculation of consumer surplus. The first 
term increases when the supply of the final product on the domestic market rises and 
the price falls as a result. The second term capturers the negative externalities borne 
by consumers, which is associated positively with the extent of privatisation and 
related opportunistic behaviour. It is clear from the last sub-section the equilibrium α 
is lowest under taxes and highest under fees (see Figures 3-a to 3-c), resulting in the 
second term in the consumer surplus equation being the largest under fees and lowest 
under taxes. Therefore, levying taxes produces, ceteris paribus, the highest consumer 
surplus, followed by no taxation at all and then levying fees. 
 
          It should be noted that consumer surplus is not always positive, even under 
taxes. When taxes are levied as the optimal regime, consumer surplus is below zero in 
the cases represented by the area denoted as ‘c-’ in Figure 4-d. According to Result 1, 
the government will choose taxes to maximise social welfare in the cases other than 
Area IV in Figure 2-d. In Area IV where levying fees is adopted as the optimal 
regime, consumer surplus is below zero. Thus, when the optimal tax regime is chosen 
to maximise social welfare, consumer surplus will become negative for any 
combination of β and γ in the union of Area IV in Figure 2-d and the area ‘c-’ in 
Figure 4-d.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Note that the deployment of clean generation technologies in the electricity sector is not easy. A 
discussion of the issue from a political economy perspective can be found in Zhang (2013). 
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Figure 4-a. Consumer Surplus                                             Figure 4-b. Consumer Surplus                         
(taxes vs no taxation)                                                            (no taxation vs fees) 
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Figure 4-c Consumer Surplus (taxes vs fees             Figure 4-d. Comparison of Consumer Surplus 
 
 
Result 4. When the export share of foreign firms is low but that of domestic firms is 
from moderate to high, the equilibrium consumer surplus under the optimal taxation 
regime is below zero. 
 
           This result indicates that the adoption of taxation regime with social welfare 
maximisation as the objective may not always bring about positive consumer surplus, 
and that the optimal taxation regime can be sub-optimal for consumer surplus under 
some circumstances. Policy makers need to be aware of potential resistance from 
consumers when implementing coal taxation reform; measures may need to be put in 
place to compensate consumers. Such measure may be particularly important when 
changes in the circumstances of downstream manufacturing sectors require a shift of 
the optimal taxation regime from taxes to fees, resulting in a further reduction of 
consumer surplus. If the direction of reform is to scrap the fees and subject coal firms 
to special taxes as discussed in the introduction section, reduced resistance from 
consumers can be expected because they would be better off under taxes.  
 
4.4 Comparison with regard to Coal Firms’ Profit 
 
           Coal firms may resist and even obstruct coal tax reform if their profits will be 
adversely affected. In addition, government officials (both central and local) may be 
hesitant to adopt the optimal regime if tax revenues from coal firms will be reduced. 
This and the next sub-sections examine, respectively, coal firm’s profit and 
government tax revenue, in order to shed light on potential challenges faced in the 
reform. 
17 
 
 
           Coal firms’ profit can be calculated based on Equations (5), (6) and (7) and the 
algebraic expressions can be found in the appendix. In Figures 5-a to 5-c, coal firms’ 
profit represented by the plain plot surface is compared with the checked plane which 
denotes zero profit. It is clear that coal firms can always make profit under fees. 
Under taxes, they will make a loss when the export share of foreign manufacturing 
firms is either very low or very high. In the other cases, profit can be made. Profit 
under taxes will be higher than that under fees when γ is moderate and β falls 
outside the middle range.  
 
According to Result 1, levying fees is optimal in Area IV of Figure 2-d. It can be 
expected that the adoption of the optimal regime in that area will not face resistance 
from coal firms because their profit there will be highest under fees. Outside Area IV 
when taxies are levied as the optimal regime, coal firms will support the reform if γ 
is from moderate to high and β is low or when γ is moderate and β is high. 
However, they will become resistant if their profit is reduced, in particular when they 
start making a loss instead of profit. This is a potential obstacle to the reform move of 
scraping the fees, given the stronghold of major state-owned or -controlled coal 
companies.  
 
 
                 
Figure 5-a. Coal Firms’ Profit (taxes)                             Figure 5-b. Coal Firms’ Profit (fees)    
 
 
Figure 5-c. Coal Firms’ Profit (no taxation) 
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4.5 Comparison with regard to Government Revenue 
 
           While taxes and fees are levied in the coal industry, the government quite often 
subsidise coal firms, partly for the purpose of attracting and encouraging investment 
in the sector. When comparing between coal taxation regimes, we take account of 
both fiscal revenue collected in the form of taxes and fees and government spending 
in the form of subsidies to coal firms. 
 
           When no taxation is levied, government tax revenue is zero. Tax revenue under 
fees is given in Equation (A13) and that under taxes is GT=t×πd
*
 (see the appendix 
for the algebraic expression). Constructed in a similar way to the figures in 
subsections 4.1 and 4.3, Figures 6-a to 6-c compare government revenue between the 
different regimes.  
 
           Government revenue under taxes is always below zero, indicating the 
government is in fact subsidising coal firms. If fees are levied, government revenue is 
negative in two areas. One is when domestic firms’ export share (β) is around 0.5 
and that of foreign firms (γ)is high. The other is when β is moderate and γ is low, 
the cases which fall within Area IV in Figure 2-d. If levying fees is adopted as the 
optimal taxation regime in this area and levying taxes in other circumstances, the 
government will have to face worsening fiscal situation. This finding is in line with 
the conclusion of Collier and Hoeffler (2005), Gupta and Sen (2007) and Moore 
(2007), which find resource rich countries are usually associated with poor fiscal 
performance and warn of increasing rent-seeking behaviour of government officials.  
 
 
                    
Figure 6-a. Government Revenue                                   Figure 6-b. Government Revenue    
(fees vs taxes)                                                                      (no taxation vs taxes) 
 
Figure 6-c. Government Revenue (fees vs no taxation) 
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          Coming back to our results, the danger is that government officials may simply 
choose to oppose the adoption of the optimal taxation regime. It’s not clear whether 
the fiscal deficit can be covered by other sources of government revenue such as tax 
revenue from downstream manufacturing firms.
18
 Even if it is possible, given the fact 
that the provinces in which coal mines concentrate are not those where most export-
oriented manufacturing firms locate, the adoption of the optimal taxation regime will 
create huge fiscal imbalance between the regions with rich coal reserves and those in 
which manufacturing firms cluster. With difficulty in inter-province fiscal transfers in 
the context of China’s fiscal decentralisation, officials in coal-abundant provinces 
would endeavour to block coal taxation reform. If the optimal taxation regime is 
adopted by the central government in a top-down approach, local officials in coal-rich 
provinces will tend to commit rent-seeking and corrupt practices or/and create 
difficulty in enforcement.
19
  
 
 
5. Case Study – The Policilicon Sector 
 
           This section presents a numerical case study to illustrate what would be the 
optimal coal taxation regime if policy makers took a broader view – taking into 
consideration the implications for downstream firms. In other words, policy makers’ 
choice of taxation regime for maximising social welfare and coal firms’ decision on 
privatisation can be expressed as the functions of the circumstances in downstream 
manufacturing sectors – more precisely, β and γ. An ideal case study in point is to 
base the analysis on the situation of electricity-intensive, export-oriented 
manufacturing sectors as a whole. However, this approach suffers from potential 
difficulty in interpreting β and γaggregated from industries which are 
heterogeneous in the two parameters. For simplicity, we choose to focus on one 
typical industry for the illustrative purpose. The caveat is that the government’s 
choice of coal taxation regime should, by no means, be made on the basis of the 
situation in this industry or any other individual industries.  
 
           The downstream industry we choose to look at is China’s polysilicon sector, an 
industry in which the capacity of domestic firms has increased rapidly since 2008 and 
now a significant share of domestic output is exported. China-based polysilicon firms 
currently have 30% of the world market share (China Silicon Industry, 2013). There 
have been intensified trade frictions and increasing cases of major trading countries 
accusing each other of ‘dumping’. This is also an energy-intensive industry, 
especially so in China where the dominant technology is the ‘Siemens’ process, a 
method consuming more electricity than alternative processes. Thus, it is an industry 
for which policies and reforms adopted in energy such as the coal sector may have 
important implications. Producing polysilicon by the ‘Siemens’ method is also very 
polluting, creating substantial negative externalities. For all these reasons, this 
industry is chosen for the numerical application of the model.  
 
 
                                                 
18
 This is an interesting question, but no answer can be obtained from the model presented in the paper. 
Future research effort could be made to establish a model incorporating the issue.  
19
 Poor enforcement at local levels of rules and regulations issued by central government is discussed in 
literature such as Williams and Kahrl (2008), Xu (2011) and Zhang (2013).  
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           In the illustrative case study, we use the data for the years from 2009 to 2012, a 
period in which China-based polysilicon firms grew rapidly and China started to 
become the target of dumping and anti-dumping strategies of other countries. Table 1 
shows the outputs of China and other major trading countries, with the measures of 
industry concentration presented in the last three rows. The annual export share of 
Chinese firms, β, is calculated based on data from Silicon China. Using the data from 
the same source on China’s import of polysilicon and the total production of other 
major trading countries presented in Table 1, the annual export share of foreign firms,
γ, is calculated.20 Table 2 presents the values of β and γ, the corresponding 
optimal regime of coal taxation, and the signs of the variables discussed in the last 
sections. 
21
 
 
 
Table 1. Output of Polysilicon in Main Trading Countries 
Countries 
 
2009  2010  2011  2012 
 Output    Output    Output    Output  
China 18823   52880   79041   110744  
Taiwan, China 740   2080   3109   4356  
Korea 8000  17200  33900  50500 
USA 25100  37801  44300  47000 
German 12300  31100  32700  35800 
Japan 16200  22900  24100  27200 
Norway 9000  13000  16000  17000 
Italy 0  1000  2500  3500 
Holland 200  1800  1800  2800 
Russia 600  1600  1800  2000 
UK 153  1000  1200  1500 
Canada 50  200  200  n.a. 
World Total 91166   182561   240650   302400  
CR4 0.7944  0.7925  0.7893  0.807 
CR10 0.9995  0.9934  0.9942  0.995 
HHI 1857.74  1858.43  1949.36  2119.22 
Source: http://www.sxgxt.gov.cn/0/1/16/91/9982.htm;  
the industry concentration indicators are calculated by authors). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 An accurate calculation of γ needs data on the output of all the other countries than China, which 
we did not have. Instead, we calculated the aggregate output of other major trading countries and used 
it in the computation of γ. This would not be a major problem, given the high CR10.  
21
 In a pure application of the theoretical model, β and γ are decided by downstream firms after 
observing policy maker’s choice of the taxation regime and coal firms’ decision on privatisation. 
However, there are no real data that could be used to calculate such parameters, given the imaginary 
nature of the three scenarios depicted in the model. What the numerical case study does is to illustrate 
what the optimal taxation regime would be if the equilibrium export shares of downstream firms were 
as given by the data for the period. 
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Table 2. Application of the Model to the Polysilicon Industry:  
Optimal Coal Taxation Regime 
Year  (β,γ) Optimal taxation 
mode 
π CS α G 
2009 (0.76, 0.299) taxes πT>0 CST<0 αT<1 GT<0 
2010 (0.42, 0.366) taxes πT>0 CST>0 αT<1 GT<0 
2011 (0.16, 0.4) taxes πT>0 CST>0 αT<1 GT<0 
2012 (0.12, 0.279) taxes πT>0 CST>0 αT<1 GT<0 
Sources: constructed by authors based on data from 
http://www.siliconchina.org/duojinggui/tongji/2.html and 
http://www.sxgxt.gov.cn/0/1/16/91/9982.htm. 
 
 
           As shown in Table 2, over the time period studied, the optimal taxation regime 
for welfare maximisation would be levying taxes. With the adoption of this regime, 
consumer surplus would be positive in all the years but 2009, in which it would be 
just below zero. Nonetheless, it seems less likely that consumers would resist the 
reform of coal taxation towards levying taxes, if adopted. Levying taxes as the 
optimal regime would incur negative government revenue, however. A closer look at 
the combinations of β and γ presented in the table reveals that government would 
always enjoy fiscal surplus under fees, implying that government officials would 
likely seek to obstruct the reform moving away from levying fees towards levying 
taxes.  
 
           Would coal firms welcome the adoption of the optimal taxation regime and 
would they engage in opportunistic behaviour in privatisation? The combinations of 
β and γ in these years all fell within the area in which coal firms would enjoy 
profit under taxes, and it is therefore less likely that they would resist the adoption of 
taxes. Under this regime, they would not engage in opportunistic practices.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
           Taxation of non-renewable extractive energy resources such as coal is 
important for the inter-generational and environmental dimensions of sustainable 
development. It has significant implications for not only firms in the coal sector but 
also for the downstream manufacturing industries. In an open economy like China 
whose rapid economic growth has been fuelled by coal or coal-based energy and 
depended to a great extent on the export of manufacturing goods, it is necessary for 
policy makers to take a broader view when reforming coal taxation and take into 
consideration the linkages between the sector and other part of the economy. The 
paper develops a model of three-stage game, tailored to the context of China where 
the coal taxation reform takes place against the background of privatisation of coal 
firms and an open economy. 
 
           The findings of this paper show that levying coal-specific taxes is optimal for 
social welfare under most circumstances. Also, this tax regime will not encourage 
coal firms to engage in opportunistic behaviour in most cases. In the cases it does, the 
extent of such behaviour will be less severe compared with the other regimes. When 
domestic manufacturing firms export a moderate share of their output and foreign 
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firms export a small share, levying the lump-sum fees is optimal for social welfare. 
However, this will make coal firms more willing to engage in opportunistic practices 
in the process of privatisation.  
 
         We also showed that the adoption of optimal taxation regime will not always be 
associated with positive consumer surplus. Resistance from consumers when they 
become the loser presents a potential challenge to the reform. Under some 
circumstances, the use of optimal taxation regime will reduce coal firms’ profit and 
even causes losses for them, thus making them resistant to reform. Similarly, with 
negative government tax revenues as the result of adopting the optimal taxation 
regime, government officials would likely try to block the reform or, if unsuccessful, 
seek to engage in rent-seeking behaviour and create difficulties in enforcement. 
 
           Several policy implications can be drawn. Firstly, it is important for policy 
makers to look beyond the boundary of the coal industry when designing and 
implementing coal tax reform. Secondly, it is advisable to scrape the lump-sum fees, 
which have long been imposed on coal firms, when the circumstances in downstream 
industries point to coal-specific taxes as the optimal regime. Thirdly, it is critical for 
policy makers to identify the group(s) which will become the losers in the reform 
process and come up with schemes to mitigate their losses, in order to reduce 
potential resistance from them.  
 
          The paper has limitations. Sustainable development of the coal sector involves 
at least two dimensions: environmental and intergenerational. The model depicted in 
the analysis does not explicitly address environmental issues, although it does 
incorporate negative externalities associated with coal firms. Further research attempt 
could be made to have environmental externalities directly modeled. The analysis in 
the paper is at large static, thus unable to address intergenerational externalities 
related to the sector, which are intertemporal in nature and require a more dynamic 
model. Last but not least, the paper does not touch upon the exact form in which coal-
specific taxes take – price- or volume-based. Future research could be conducted to 
make comparison between them in order to shed light to benefits associated with 
price-based taxes, which are expected to come into effect in China soon.  
 
23 
 
References 
 
Aarrestad, J. (1978), ‘Optimal Savings and Exhaustible Resource Extraction in An 
Open Economy’, Journal of Economic Theory, 19, 163-179. 
 
Alexeev, M. (1999), ‘Privatization and the Distribution of Wealth in Russia’, 
Economics of Transition, 7(2), 449-65. 
 
Bagwell, K. and Staiger, R.W. (1999), ‘An Economic Theory of GATT’, American 
Economic Review, 89(1), 215-248. 
 
Banerjee, S. G. and Munger, M. C. (2004), ‘Move to Markets? An Empirical Analysis 
of Privatization in Developing Countries’, Journal of International Development, 
16(2), 213-240. 
 
Black, B., Kraakman, R. and Tarassova, . (2000),’Russian Privatization and Corporate 
Governance: What Went Wrong?’, Stanford Law Review 52, 1731-1808. 
 
Bolton, P., Roland, G.; Vickers, J. and Burda, M. (1992), ‘Privatization Policies in 
Central and Eastern Europe’, Economic Policy, 275-309. 
 
Bosquet, B. (2002), ‘The role of natural resources in fundamental tax reform in the 
Russian federation’, mimeo. 
 
Boycko, M., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1994), ‘A Theory of Privatization’, 
mimeo. 
 
Brander, J.A. and y Djajic, S. (1983), ‘Rent‑Extracting Tariffs and the Management 
of Exhaustible Resources’, Canadian Journal of Economics, 16(2), 288‑298. 
 
Brander, J.A. and Spencer B.J. (1985), ‘Export Subsidies and International Market 
Share Rivalry’, Journal of International Economics, 18, 83-100. 
 
Bretschger, L. and Valente, S. (2010), ‘Endogenous Growth, Asymmetric Trade and 
Resource Taxation’, CER-ETH working Paper, No. 10/132. 
 
CER-ETH – Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich Working Paper 10/132. 
Burness, H.S. (1976), 'On the Extraction of Replenishable Natural Resources', Journal 
of Environmental Economics and Management, 3(4), 289-311. 
 
Chang, W.W. (2005), ‘Optimal Trade and Privatization Policies in An International 
Duopoloy with Cost Asymmetry’, Journal of International Trade & Economic 
Development, 14(1), 19-42. 
 
Chao, C. and Yu, E.S.H. (2006), ‘Partial Privatization, Foreign Competition and 
Optimum Tariff’, Review of International Economics, 14(1), 87-92. 
 
China Silicon Industry (2013), http://www.siliconchina.org/duojinggui/tongji/2.html 
(accessed in October 2013). 
 
24 
 
Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2005), ‘Democracy and Natural Resource Rents’, CGRP 
Working Papers, No. 016, Department of Economics, Oxford University. 
 
Conrad, R.F. and Hool, B. (1981), 'Resource Taxation with Heterogeneous Quality 
and Endogenous Reserves.' Journal of Public Economics, 16(1), 17-33 
 
Cremer, H., Marchand, M. and Thisse, J. (1989), ‘The Public Firm as An Instrument 
for Regulating An Oligopolistic Market’, Oxford Economic Papers, 41, 283-301. 
 
Cremer, H., Marchand, M. and Thisse, J. (1989), ‘Mixed Oligopoly with 
Differentiated Products’, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 9(1), 43-
53. 
 
Dasgupta, P., Heal, G.M. and Stiglitz, J.E. (1980), 'The Taxation of Exhaustible Re-
sources.' In G.A. Hughes and G.M. Heal (eds.), Public Policy and the Tax System, 
(London: George Allen & Unwin). 
 
Dasgupta, P., Eastwood, R. and Heal, G. (1978), ‘Resource Management in A Trading 
Economy’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 92(2), 297-306. 
 
Dasgupta, P. and Heal, G. (1974), 'The Optimal Depletion of Exhaustible Resources', 
Review of Economic Studies, 41 (Symposium Issue), 3-28. 
 
DeFraja, G. and Delbono, F. (1989), ‘Alternative Strategies of A Public Enterprise in 
Oligopoly’, Oxford Economic Papers, 41, 302-311. 
 
Dewatripont, M. and Roland, G. (1992), ‘The Virtues of Gradualism and Legitimacy 
in the Transition to a Market Economy’, The Economic Journal, 102, 291-300. 
 
Easton, J. and Grossman, G.M. (1986), ‘Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under 
Oligopoly’, NBER Working Paper No. 1236, NBER Programs, IFM. 
 
Estache, A. and Wren-Lewis, L. (2009), ‘Toward a Theory of Regulation for 
Developing Countries: Following Jean-Jacques Laffont’s Lead’, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 47(3), 729-770. 
 
Fershtman, C. (1990), ‘The Interdependence between Ownership Status and Market 
Structure: the Case of Privatization’, Economica, 57, 319-328. 
 
Filatotchev, I., Wright, M. and Bleaney, M. (2003), ‘Privatisation, Insider Control and 
Managerial Entrenchment in Russia’, Economics of Transition, 7(2), 481-504. 
 
Fjell, K. and Heywood, J.S. (2002), ‘Public Stackelberg Leadership in A Mixed 
Oligopoly with Foreign Firms’, Australian Economic Papers, 41, 267-281. 
 
Fjell, K., and Pal, D. (1996), ‘A Mixed Oligopoly in the Presence of Foreign Private 
Firms’, Canadian Journal of Economics, 29, 737-743.  
 
25 
 
Frydman, R., Gray, C., Hessel, M. and Rapaczynski, A. (1999), ‘When Does 
Privatization Work? the Impact of Private Ownership on Corporate Performance in 
the Transition Economies’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(4), 1153-92. 
 
Garnaut, R. and A. Clunies Ross (1975), ‘Uncertainty, Risk Aversion and the Taxing 
of Natural Resource Projects’, Economic Journal, 85:338, 272–87. 
 
George, K. and La Manna, M. (1996), ‘Mixed Duopoly, Inefficiency, and Public 
Ownership’, Review of Industrial Organization, 11, 853-860. 
 
Gupta, S. and Sen, A. (2007), ‘Determinants of Tax Revenue Effort in Developing 
Countries’, IMF Working Papers, No/07/184.  
 
Heaps, T. (1985), 'The Taxation of Nonreplenishable Natural Resources Revisited.' 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 12(1), 14-27. 
 
Hillman, A.L., and Van Long, N. (1983), ‘Pricing and Depletion of An Exhaustible 
Resource When There Is Anticipation of Trade Disruption. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 98(2), 215-233. 
 
IEA (2000), Coal in the Energy Supply of China, International Energy Agency, 
OECD Publishing, Paris. doi 10.1787/9789264182066-en 
 
IEA (2012), Medium-Term Coal Market Report 2012, OECD/IEA, International 
Energy Agency, Paris. 
 
Hotelling, H. (1931), ‘The Economics of Exhaustible Resources’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 39(2), 137-175. 
 
Krautkraemer, J.A. (1998), ‘Nonrenewable Resource Scarcity’, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 36(4), 2065-2107. 
 
Laffont, J. (2005), Regulation and Development, Cambridge University Press; 
Cambridge. 
 
Leahy, D. and Neary, J.P. (2001), ‘Robust Rules for Industrial Policy in Open 
Economies’, Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 10(4), 393-
409. 
 
Li, G. and Zhang, H. (2012), ‘A Study on Reasonable Adjustments in Taxation of 
Coal Extraction under Three Constraints’, Economists, 2012.1, 74-80. (in Chinese) 
 
Lin, B. and Jiang, Z. (2011), ‘Estimates of energy subsidies in China and Impact of 
Energy Subsidy Reform’, Energy Economics, 33(2), 273-283. 
 
Lipton, D., Sachs, J. and Summers, L.H. (1990), ‘Privatization in Eastern Europe: the 
case of Poland’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1990(2), 293-341. 
 
Livernois, J.R. and Uhler, R.S. (1987), ‘Extraction Costs and the Economics of 
Nonrenewable Resources’, Journal of Political Economy, 95(1), 195-203. 
26 
 
 
Lund, D. (2002), ‘Petroleum Tax Reform Proposals in Norway and Denmark’, Energy 
Journal, 23:4, pp. 37–56. 
 
Ma, H.Y. and Oxley, L. (2010), ‘The Integration of Major Fuel Source Markets in 
China: Evidence from Panel Co-integration Test’, Energy Economics, 32(5), 1139-
1146. 
 
Maggi, G. (1996), ‘Strategic Trade Policies with Endogenous Mode of Competition’, 
American Economic Review, 86, 237-258. 
 
Matsumura, T. (1998), ‘Partial Privatisation in Mixed Duopoly’, Journal of Public 
Economics, 70, 473-483. 
 
Milanovic, B. (1991), ‘Privatisation in Post-communist Societies’, Communist 
Economies and Economic Transformation, 3(1), 5-39. 
 
Moore, M. (2007), ‘How Does Taxation Affect the Quality of Governance?’, IDS 
Working Paper, No.280, University of Sussex. 
 
Mujumdar, S. and Pal, D. (1998), ‘Effects of Indirect Taxation in A Mixed Oligopoly’, 
Economics Letters, 58(2), 199-204. 
 
Neary, J.P. and Leahy, D. (2000), ‘Strategic Trade and Industry Policy towards 
Dynamic Oligopolies’, The Economic Journal, 110, 484-508. 
 
Newbery, D. (1991), ‘Reform in Hungary: Sequencing and Privatization’, European 
Economic Review, 35(2-3), 571-580. 
 
Peng, W. (2011), ‘Coal Sector Reform and Its Implications for the Power Sector in 
China’, Resources Policy, 36, 60-71. 
 
Pindyck, R.S. (1980), ‘Uncertainty and Natural Resource Market’, Journal of 
Political Economy, 88(6), 1203-1225. 
 
Richter, T. (2002), ‘The Voucher Privatization and its Impacts on the Governance and 
Financing of Czech Stock Corporations’, http://ssrn.com/abstract=481664 
 
Serizawa, N. (2000), ‘Optimal Trade Policy in an International Mixed Oligopoly’, 
Seoul Journal of Economics, 13(2), 107-122. 
 
Slade, M.R. (1986), ‘Taxation of Non-renewable Resources at Various Stages of 
Production’, Canadian Journal of Economics, 19(2), 281-297. 
 
Shi, X. (2010), ‘Restructuring in China’s State-owned Enterprises: Evidence from the 
Coal Industry’, China & World Economy, 18(3), 90-105. 
 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1994), ‘Politicians and Firms’, The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 109(4), 995-1025. 
 
27 
 
Spencer, B.J. and Brander, J.A. (1983), ‘International R&D Rivalry and Industrial 
Strategy’, Review of Economic Studies, 50, 707-722. 
 
Stiglitz, J.E. (1976), ‘Monopoly and the Rate of Extraction of Exhaustible Resources’, 
American Economic Review, 66(4), 655-661. 
 
White, M. (1996), ‘Mixed Oligopoly, Privatization and Subsidization’, Economic 
Letters, 53, 189-195. 
 
Williams, J.H. and Kahrl, F. (2008), ‘Electricity Reform and Sustainable 
Development in China’, Environmental Research Letters, 3(4). 
http://www.iop.org/EJ/article/1748-9326/3/4/044009/erl8_4_044009.html 
 
Winiecki, J. (1990), ‘Privatization in Communist Economies: Crucial Differences and 
Problems’, Economic Affairs, 10(4), 36-42. 
 
Xu, C. (2011), ‘The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development’, 
Journal of Economic Literature, 49(4), 1076-1151. 
 
Xu, Y.C. (2008), ‘Strong Enterprises, Weak Government: Energy Policy Making in 
China’, International Journal of Global Energy, 29(4), 434-453. 
 
Zhang, Y-F. (2013), ‘Regulatory Framework and Sustainable Development of the 
Electricity Sector: The Case of China’, IDPM Working Paper Series, University of 
Manchester.  
 
28 
 
Appendix 1 
 
 Expanded Algebraic expressions of qd*, qf*: 
)12127()674(2784
)]25(42)[ca(
q,
)12127()674(2784
)]21(452)[ca(
q
2222
2
*
f2222
2
*
d





  (A1) 
 
 Expanded Algebraic expressions of πd*: 
0
)]12127()674(2784[
)]21(452)[221()ca(
22222
2222
*
d 


                                  (A2) 
 
 Expanded Algebraic expressions of t(β, γ): 
)]481301498420()481321528922(
)2436267(286770368[4
)]381081297118(2)6822029417047(-
)28-6240-13(2)20125(-41-98103-5212-)[ca(
),(t
4324322
323432
4324322
32324432




          (A3) 
 
 Expanded Algebraic expressions of α under different taxation regimes 
 
22
4324322
32324432
T
)]21(452[4
)381081297118(2)6422029417047(
)28624013(2)20125(41981035212
),(



     (A4) 
 
22
4324322
32324432
F
)]21(452[2
)381161438020(2)341101498724(2
)28624013(2)20125(571381447216
),(



  (A5) 
 
22
4324322
32324432
N
)]21(452[2
)381081297118(2)6822029417047(
)28624013(2)20125(41981035212
),(



  (A6) 
 
 Expanded Algebraic expressions of WT(β, γ) under different taxation 
regimes 
2222222
8765432
87654322
87654323
87654324
7654325
654326
54327228
87654322
T
)]12127()674(2784[)]21(452[16
)]7062371768956312845711997574809305187484856(4
)32344200648545668858724862758570512244358624567416(
)2584254288963016701218913113677062932170892154(4
)462438432154184329064415278326284161054466046345(
)190411136286804064234368180335521821(4
)2928121602134819916112263622593(2
)56015761684105235665(4)20125(
7953380528532211562010316161096245045856656[)ca(
),(W










  
                                                                                                                                     (A7)   
29 
 
 
22222
4322432
32324432
2
F
)]12127()674(2784[4
)9833442924357(2)20458467035680(
)9219012833(2)524413(8921822611224
)ca(W




 (A8) 
 
 
22222
4324322
32324222
N
)]12127()674(2784[2
)]431071186416(4)8224229316844(2
)26493310(4)20125()784[()ca(
),(W



  (A9) 
 
 Algebraic expressions of the coal firms’ profit under different taxation 
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 Algebraic expression of government tax revenue under different taxation 
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Hessian Matrices of πd and πf 
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